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Abstract
In this paper, I discuss Richard Feldman’s article “Reasonable Religious
Disagreement”. In his article, Feldman argues that “reasonable disagreement” is not
possible between two “epistemic peers” who have shared all of their evidence.
Regardless of whether Feldman’s argument is valid, the two requirements (being
epistemic peers and sharing all their evidence) he sets for ruling out a disagreement as
reasonable could be impossible to meet in the very situations he is writing about. I argue
that in situations of religious disagreements, from the outset the parties involved have
reason to judge each other not to be epistemic peers, and that there is some evidence in
many religious disagreements that is both relevant to the disagreement and impossible to
fully share.
Key Terms:
Epistemic Peers – two people who, given the same body of evidence, are equally likely to
reach the same conclusion about a given proposition.
Evidence – internal things, such as ideas or memories, which should (epistemically
speaking) influence the attitude the owner has towards belief in a given proposition.
Evidentialism – a system of belief justification that advocates belief in a given
proposition if and only if that proposition is supported by the evidence.
Reasonable Disagreement – a disagreement in which the parties have reached
contradictory conclusions reasonably.
Uniqueness Thesis – a body of evidence can support only non-contradictory propositions.
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Introduction
Under what circumstances can two people reasonably disagree? If I affirm some
belief as true, I am logically committed to the position that anyone who believes
something contradictory is mistaken. The person with whom I disagree could have come
about the contradictory conclusion either reasonably or unreasonably. What if both of us
have come to accept our conclusions reasonably? Richard Feldman has addressed this
very issue at length. In his article “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” Feldman
assesses the possibility of reasonable disagreement.1 He argues that when two people of
roughly equal intellect and reasoning have shared all their evidence concerning a
proposition, they cannot reasonably form contradictory beliefs about the proposition.
Feldman’s argument hinges upon several definitions: he defines disagreement as a
situation in which one person believes a proposition that another disbelieves. Two people
are epistemic peers according to Feldman if they are about equal in terms of intellect,
rationality, background beliefs, and are informed to about the same extent in whatever
area they are to be considered epistemic peers. Feldman says that two people have shared
their evidence when they have fully explained their reasons for their beliefs and withheld
no relevant information.
I question whether two people who disagree on fundamental issues like the
existence of God should judge each other as epistemic peers and whether they can share

1

Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Philosophers Without Gods:
Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Ed. Antony, Louise. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007. 194‐214.

all of their evidence in religious disagreements. It will be my position that, while
Feldman’s argument rules out reasonable disagreement between epistemic peers who
have shared all their evidence, two people might have reason to not judge each other as
peers in regards to religious beliefs when they disagree on certain things. I will also argue
that two parties cannot always share all of their evidence in a religious disagreement.
Cases in which peerhood cannot be established and important evidence cannot be shared
avoid the argument Feldman sets forth to rule out reasonable disagreement. I will argue
that religious disagreements can be examples of these problems. First, in Section I I will
outline Feldman’s argument. Next, in Section II I will discuss whether someone who
disagrees with you about certain religious beliefs has reason to be judged as not an
epistemic peer. After that, in Section III I will argue that evidence in religious
disagreements cannot always be shared. Finally, in Section IV I will tie the arguments
together and make a judgment about religious disagreements.
Section I
First, a good understanding of Feldman’s argument is in order. Feldman’s
argument is simple enough, but there are many terms and ideas in his writing that deserve
some explanation. Firstly, Feldman is an evidentialist. Evidentialism as employed by
Feldman is a system of belief justification that states a person is justified in believing a
proposition if and only if that proposition is supported by the evidence at the time of
belief.2 Evidentialism, argued for by writers such as William Clifford in his article, “The
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Feldman is precise in the way he approaches justification; he is always writing about whether someone is
justified at a specific moment in time.
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Ethics of Belief,” is a widely held system of epistemic belief justification.3 Feldman also
supports the uniqueness thesis. The uniqueness thesis, as Feldman proposes it, says that a
given body of evidence cannot support contradictory propositions. Given the uniqueness
thesis, reasonable4 disagreement is not possible between two epistemic peers who have
shared all the evidence. If two epistemic peers were sharing the same evidence, and only
non-contradictory propositions could reasonably be supported from that evidence, then it
would not be possible for either of those peers to reasonably reach a conclusion that
contradicted one reached by the other. For a reasonable disagreement, at least one party
would have to be withholding evidence or be making a mistake in reason. So, a
reasonable disagreement between two epistemic peers who have shared all their evidence
is impossible for Feldman. Two people can reasonably disagree, but never when the
evidence is fully shared between epistemic peers.
In regards to disagreement Feldman writes about attitudes towards a proposition.
For Feldman, only one of three epistemic attitudes towards a proposition can be justified
by a given body of evidence: belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment. If the body of
evidence is, for example, concerning the existence of God, either there is reason enough
to believe that God does exist, reason enough to believe that God does not exist, or the
evidence is counter-balanced. In cases where the evidence is counter-balanced, suspense
of judgment is (according to Feldman) the correct attitude. Suspending judgment means
3

Clifford, William. “The Ethics of Belief”. Philosophy of Religion Selected Readings. Ed. Peterson,
Michael; Hasker, William; Reichenbach, Bruce; Basinger, David. New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010. 99-104. Feldman and Clifford are both evidentialists, but they are certainly
different breeds. Clifford never separated the ethics of believing something and the epistemic justification
thereof. Feldman, on the other hand, is writing about two distinct things and when he writes about beliefs
he is referring purely to the epistemic justification someone does or does not have.
4
Feldman always means “reasonable” in the evidentialist sense, as to whether the evidence supports the
belief.
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withholding belief one way or the other. From a body of evidence, multiple conclusions
may be drawn, but none of these will be conflicting – all cases of mutual exclusivity will
result in only one mutually exclusive claim being adopted. A body of evidence
concerning competing cable companies might justify multiple propositions, like a belief
as to which company has the lowest prices, or which company has the most channels, but
never will any of these conclusions be contradictory (for instance, it could not support the
propositions, “Company X has the most channels,” and, “Company Y has the most
channels”).
Feldman makes his case with religious disagreements in mind – disagreements
involving religious propositions. He aims to show that for disagreements about questions
such as, “Does God exist?” there can be only one reasonable conclusion reached by two
epistemic peers sharing all their relevant evidence. Specifically, if an atheist and a theist
were to sit down, given the right conditions and amount of time, if they are epistemic
peers and share all of their evidence concerning the existence of God, they ought to reach
a point where they cannot reasonably disagree about the matter – one or both of them
must change positions.
Feldman writes at length about evidence, but what does he mean by the term? In
“Evidence,” Timothy McGrew writes about evidence as always being evidence of
something.5 If a fingerprint is evidence, then it is evidence of something, like a murder or
a robbery. Feldman writes about evidence as reason for believing something. Usually
when we think of evidence, we imagine a courtroom and exhibits. When Feldman writes
5

McGrew, Timothy. “Evidence”. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Ed. Bernecker, Sven and
Pritchard, Duncan. P 58.
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about evidence, he means something less physical. For Feldman, evidence is a term for
all the reasons someone has for believing a proposition. In a courtroom, a document, the
testimony of an eye-witness, or a ballistics report might be considered evidence. The two
uses are not synonymous. While someone may form a belief based on something like a
document or the testimony of a witness, the physical document or the actual testimony of
that person wouldn’t really be that person’s evidence for Feldman.6 Those things cannot
be carried around everywhere and shared with other people. Instead, the memory,
interpretation, or understanding that someone has of something like a document or
testimony would be that person’s evidence. Further, Feldman and other philosophers
believe that there are different types, or orders, of evidence. In his article, “Respecting the
Evidence,” Feldman writes about two different kinds of evidence: first and second order.7
Most of our evidence is first order. Jones goes to the store and buys groceries, forming
beliefs based on of first order evidence along the way: he sees a tree, remembers the
directions to the store, meditates on which brand of flour to buy, and so forth. Second
order evidence is introduced when Jones gets evidence about his evidence, for example,
when he learns that Smith disagrees with him on the directions to the store.
The various memories, conceptualizations, and impressions we have make up our
reasons for believing things, and thus are our bodies of evidence, according Feldman. To
rule out reasonable disagreement, all the relevant evidence must be shared. “Relevant”
raises a few questions. We may not always know or be able to tell what evidence is

6

Feldman is an internalist; for him, reasons for a belief must be internally accessible to the person in
question.
7
Feldman, Richard. “Respecting the Evidence”. Philosophical Perspectives. Vol. 19, Issue 1, 2005. Pp.
95–119.
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relevant. Relevant evidence would be evidence that should influence our attitude towards
a certain proposition. It follows, then, that evidence that should influence our attitude
towards other relevant evidence would also be relevant evidence. For a given belief, a
very large body of relevant evidence could be involved. It may even be the case that the
body of evidence for a given dispute could be much too large to manage, or take too long
to sort through as an issue of practicality. Feldman would probably say that this problem
can be solved by dividing large disagreements into smaller ones and working out the
smaller ones one at a time. Dividing up large disagreements into many smaller ones may
not be a very practical solution, but the issue at hand is whether it would be possible. Of
course whether it is a reasonable expectation in the real world is still important.
Assuming enough time and effort, though, even large bodies of evidence might be
worked through, at least in principle.
Feldman would not say that “all evidence must be shared.” Rather, Feldman
argues that all the evidence relevant to the disagreement at hand must be shared. How do
we know what evidence is and is not relevant? Relevant evidence should (epistemically
speaking, not morally) influence an attitude towards the belief it is relevant to, whereas
evidence that is not relevant should not. The obvious question becomes: how do we tell
the difference? Here I draw a distinction between reasons and causes. It would be a
mistake to conflate the two because they are not always synonymous, and Feldman is
writing strictly about “reasons”. For example, consider a girl who forms a belief about
God. She forms the belief due to the outside influences of her society, culture and family.
When asked about her belief, she cannot name any reasons for holding the belief or cite
any evidence for the belief. By her own admission, the belief was caused by forces
6

outside of herself. It would be safe to call her family, culture and society the causes of
her belief, but not fair to call them her reasons for belief. Reasons are more than a simple
causal relationship between a belief and its origin – they have justifications and indicate
that a belief is true, while causes merely explain the fact of how the belief originated.
Feldman, therefore, writes about reasons, not causes.
Section II
Feldman says that if two people do not judge each other as epistemic peers, they
could still reasonably disagree because a discrepancy in peer status would sufficiently
explain why they disagree. What exactly this peer status means, though, is not precisely
stated by Feldman. Feldman says only that, “Let’s say two people are epistemic peers
when they are roughly equal with respect to intelligence, reasoning powers, background
information, and so on.”8 It is clear from his argument, though, what epistemic peer must
mean in order to make his argument valid. If two people in a disagreement could share all
their evidence and still disagree, there must be some reason why. Either one of them is
making a mistake or they are not peers, resulting in differing conclusions. An epistemic
peer is someone, who, given the same body of evidence, would (unless making an error
in reason) reach the same conclusion as someone else of equal peer status. Two people
are epistemic peers when they are not different enough in terms of certain factors. These
factors would be whichever ones, besides error, that could result in differing evaluations
of a given body of evidence. Two epistemic peers with one body of evidence necessitates
that if they have reached two contradictory conclusions, at least one of them made a

8

Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on
Atheism and the Secular Life. Ed. Antony, Louise. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 201.
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mistake in reason. This definition is the one Feldman must commit himself to for his
argument to be valid. It should work, but the question that remains unanswered is what
exactly constitutes those “factors” – what makes a person evaluate a given body of
evidence in a certain way. “Roughly equal with respect to intelligence, reasoning powers,
background information, and so on,” is not precise enough. We need to know why exactly
the two people would evaluate the evidence in the same way, what about them causes
them to see things similarly.
Adam Elga has written at length about the nature of epistemic peerhood. He
describes peerhood as a relationship between two people that depends upon comparison
of positions existing on a continuum from ignorance to expertise. He uses the example of
a weather forecaster in his article, “Reflection and Disagreement,” to illustrate what
would constitute an “expert” in regards to the weather.9 Elga states that the meteorologist
is an expert (highly knowledgeable) and thusly should be deferred to by non-experts, who
are not peers. Two meteorologists would be experts and peers. Two people untrained in
meteorology would be non-experts and peers. Elga’s illustration brings up two interesting
points. Firstly, being an epistemic peer is always in regards to something specific for
Elga. Secondly, it follows that someone who is an expert on weather isn’t necessarily an
expert on biology, meaning that the requirements for being someone’s epistemic peer are
different depending on the situation. Now, it seems easy at first to define what constitutes
an expert on weather: a degree in meteorology, experience correctly predicting the
weather, and knowledge of the area one is predicting the weather for. Given Elga’s

9

Elga, Adam. “Reflection and Disagreement”. Noûs. Vol. 41, Issue 3, 2007. Pp. 478-502.
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assessment of peerhood, putting someone on a continuum between ignorance and
expertise on a subject is a good way to approximate that person’s peer status in relation to
your own. Using his weather example, I would probably defer to a weather expert, call
my friend who knows as much about weather as I do a peer, and evaluate an alien who
has never experienced Earth weather less than a peer.
Suppose we ask what makes someone an expert on American politics, though.
Two people receive the same education and learn all the same things, but one has a
conservative view while the other maintains a liberal one. Both have met the
requirements of expertise, both have the same education, yet both disagree on some very
fundamental propositions concerning their expertise, such as, “What system of
government would best run our country?” They might disagree on the answer or even
what the question means and so on.
Recall the definition of epistemic peerhood that I gave for Feldman earlier. Would
a conservative and a liberal be even remotely likely to come to the same conclusion about
a proposition involving American politics? No, they would not. They would likely have
completely different opinions on any number of questions involving what would be best,
politically, for our country. We couldn’t chalk their consistent disagreement up to mere
error – they have entirely different ways of seeing things. We can say now that being
roughly equal in intelligence, reasoning ability, expertise, and so forth is not enough to
constitute epistemic peers because two people could have all of those things in common
and still be very likely to evaluate a body of evidence quite differently. Remember one
term that Feldman used in his definition, “background information.” “Background
information” now becomes very important depending on what it means. Given everything
9

said thus far, I take background information to mean something synonymous with
background beliefs. In other words, two people must have similar background beliefs in
order to be epistemic peers. To support this assumption, I argue that it fixes the problem
of the experts on politics with differing views.
Consider the liberal and the conservative again. If they had similar enough
background beliefs in addition to all those other features we have discussed, then they
would probably agree on propositions about American politics, because their background
beliefs are what make them liberal or conservative. Applied to religious disagreements,
the implications are straightforward: the atheist and theist would agree if their
background beliefs were similar enough, because those background beliefs are part of
what made them atheistic and theistic in the first place. The mere fact that one is an
atheist and one is a theist gives each of them every reason to judge that they are not
epistemic peers. This is not to say that either lacks in education, expertise, intelligence,
reasoning, or in any other area, as I have shown that two people could have all those
things in common and still evaluate evidence differently. No, an important component of
epistemic peerhood must be background beliefs, which, when vastly different, means two
parties are not peers. Since those background beliefs influence how current evidence is
interpreted and evaluated, they must factor into peerhood.
Suppose, then, that an atheist and a theist have shared all their evidence and still
disagree about the existence of God. Each one judges the other to be sharing all the
evidence relevant to the disagreement. Each one judges the other to be equally intelligent,
equally rational, and equally educated. Still, the mere difference in their background
beliefs means each is justified in assessing the other as not an epistemic peer. The
10

definition of peerhood needed to make Feldman’s argument valid results in the
conclusion that two people who reach vastly different views about the world are not
epistemic peers in the first place. His argument necessitates that “epistemic peers” are
people who when given the same body of evidence would reach the same conclusion
(barring error). But background beliefs are one such thing that could result in two people
evaluating evidence differently. Therefore, two people in a religious disagreement would
not be peers in the first place whenever background beliefs are involved in the evaluation
of the body of evidence. So long as they deem each other not to be epistemic peers, they
have every reason to assume their disagreement reasonable.
Section III
For Feldman, the reasonableness of a disagreement hinges greatly upon the
sharing of evidence between the disagreeing parties. Until the relevant evidence has been
shared, reasonable disagreement is still a possibility because two people working from
two different bodies of evidence can conceivably reach contradictory conclusions
reasonably. Once both parties have participated in full disclosure, they are supposedly
working from the same body of evidence. By full disclosure, Feldman does not mean that
two parties must share all the evidence they have about everything. It would be
impractical and most likely impossible to share all of the evidence a person has. Instead,
Feldman means that two parties need to share all the evidence that pertains to the
disagreement (relevant evidence). By way of example, in a court hearing attorneys need
only bring to trial witnesses and evidence that have to do with the guilt or innocence of
the defendant and the charges that have been brought against him. Other evidence, either
pertaining to someone else’s guilt, or the defendant’s guilt on some other issue, would be
11

unnecessary. The two parties are not necessarily working from the “same” body of
evidence in the sense that they truly share all evidence. But they do and must share all of
the evidence that either party is using to make her decision.
From here, many philosophers begin to focus on whether two people who
disagree and have shared all of their evidence can remain reasonable by asking questions
such as, “Should I give equal weight to my opponent’s view as I do to my own?”101112
These arguments often hinge on the intuition that disagreement alone shouldn’t always
reduce someone’s confidence in her own beliefs and are a response to the arguments that
peer disagreement is enough to decrease the confidence we have in our own beliefs. A
proponent of such an argument might give the example of two friends, one of whom
spots someone in a crowd, but whom the other friend insists is not there. The first friend,
rather than considering his friend equally likely to be right and thusly lowering his own
confidence, might simply assume that he possesses some insight that his friend does not.
Instead of taking this route, I would like the address questions as to whether all the
evidence can really be shared in the first place. While the conversation in philosophy
tends to go in the direction of asking questions about the fact that two people disagree, I
would like to ask whether these two people can ever get to the point of working from the
same body of evidence.

10
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Hawthorne, John and Gendler, Tamar. Vol. 1, 2005.
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What does it mean to share evidence? Is it as simple as handing someone a file or
telling that person something? Feldman does not give a specific account on this matter,
but it is a very important question. Suppose that Smith and Jones disagree about whether
it is six o’clock or seven o’clock. To convince Jones, Smith tells him that his watch reads,
“Seven o’clock.” Telling Jones that it is Seven o’clock seems like the most
straightforward way for Smith to share his evidence with Jones.
Several questions need to be answered, though. Has Smith just shared his evidence
with Jones? Suppose Jones doesn't speak English. In this case Smith hasn't. Jones does
not understand the statement. His failure to understand a statement in a language he
doesn’t know could reveal a deeper problem. What about more subtle cases? What if
Jones hears Smith and understands, but distrusts Smith’s watch? Or, what if he
"understands," but in a different way than Smith does (Some people don’t read the exact
time from a clock, but instead round off to the nearest hour. When Jones hears “seven
o’clock,” he doesn’t know whether Smith really means seven or seven o’ five)? People
can hear one statement and derive two different understandings. If we take different
meanings from the same evidence, do we really have the same evidence? Recall that
when Feldman uses the term “evidence,” he doesn’t mean the physical watch that reads
“seven o’clock.” He doesn’t even mean the spoken words of Smith, “seven o’clock.”
Feldman would call only Smith’s and Jones’ understanding of the watch and statement as
evidence, the understanding being the only thing each of them can really have internally.
What if the background experiences and evidence we use to interpret new evidence
causes us to often see that evidence in different ways, then? We could be starting worlds
apart from the onset, having different understandings of all the physical data we take in.
13

Here, Feldman would argue that Jones would be misunderstanding Smith because of
background beliefs that are too different. Obviously, two people with background
information too dissimilar will not be able to have an intelligible conversation of any
type, which would prohibit them from resolving any type of disagreement. Feldman
would say that background beliefs are part of peerhood, and that these background beliefs
must be similar enough in order for them to interpret evidence the same way, else
reasonable disagreement can and will occur just as I’ve outlined. The principle that we
take away here, though, is that for sharing of evidence to occur, it takes more than a mere
account of your evidence in order to share that evidence. The evidence must also be
understood such that it results in the two parties having the same body of evidence, or at
least two bodies close enough that it would prohibit reasonable disagreement.
Suppose that Jones takes the same meaning from Smith’s testimony that Smith
intends and has similar background beliefs. Also suppose that Jones takes the evidence as
truthful. If Smith has just shared his only reason for believing the time is seven o’clock,
and if Jones has no reasons for his belief (although this may be hard to imagine), Smith
and Jones would now be working from the same body of evidence. If Jones is convinced
by the evidence, then they have avoided disagreement altogether. If Jones is not, then
they may have still avoided reasonable disagreement, as Smith may be able to demote
Jones from peer status. If Smith has “sufficient reason” (what constitutes “sufficient”
here is disputable) to believe Jones is incapable of understanding or properly evaluating
the evidence for some reason, Smith can demote him. If Smith judges him to be a peer,

14

though, then suspense of judgment is the appropriate attitude they should both adopt and
they have still avoided a reasonable disagreement.13
In the above example and in examples like it, where two people evaluate evidence in
the same way, and take the same meaning from evidence, Feldman should be right in that
they can only reach one valid conclusion. The evidence being shared was fully shared
and shared with the same understanding of that evidence. The proposition, “seven
o’clock” meant the same thing to both Smith and Jones. All beliefs formed and evaluated
in this way between two parties should be easily and correctly examined. The question is
whether this hypothetical example is representative of real disagreements.
Evidence can mean the same thing to anyone who has it and fully shares linguistic
systems of semantics and syntax, as well as all the same background beliefs and any other
factors influencing the understanding of that evidence. Just what are we really asserting
when we make such a claim, though? All that this claim means is that if two people think
and understand things in the same exact way, or in a “close enough” way, they will
understand a specific thing in the same way. Is this not obvious, though? Imagine two
people who are exactly alike. Of course if they are independently introduced with the
same evidence they will interpret it the same way (barring random chance errors). They
will do this because they are the same person. To interpret the same evidence differently,
they would need to at least have somewhat different background beliefs or different
bodies of evidence. I will argue next that given even two people with this level of

13

Whether and under what conditions “peer demotion” can or should occur is not a topic I will address
here.
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similarity, if one of the two has one type of evidence, she may be unable to share it with
her peer.
What could stop someone who is a peer from being able to share evidence?
Suppose I am in a disagreement over the ontological argument and I remember that I was
convinced by what Plantinga had to say about it at a philosophy convention. Now
suppose that I am, in fact, able to recall what he said, and why it convinced me of his
position. Finally, suppose I now try to convey this argument to my friend with whom I
am in a disagreement. I am a timid speaker and my friend is imposing. Try as I might, I
am intimidated by his sharp wit and self-assuredness. When I try to argue with him, I feel
uneasy, and words escape me. So, despite my best efforts, my retelling of Plantinga’s
argument does not do Plantinga’s account justice. After hearing my account, my friend
decides that Plantinga’s argument is not good evidence for believing the ontological
argument. Have I fully shared my evidence with my friend? The answer seems to be no.
For us to fully share the evidence, my friend and I need the same understanding of
Plantinga. Whether it is possible for us to have an exactly similar understanding of
something as complex as Plantinga’s ontological argument is another puzzle entirely, so
assume what is needed is a “close enough” understanding of Plantinga. By “close
enough” I mean close enough so that it doesn’t make a difference in interpretation or
evaluation of relevant evidence. Given that, it still seems possible that I could fail to
convey all of my relevant information. By that I simply mean that it could be possible for
someone to have evidence that person would not be fully able to express. Feldman might
respond that in an ideal situation, everyone involved is adequately capable of expressing

16

his evidence. Feldman can be granted this ideal situation with some hesitation.14 At least
some religious disagreements involve two people calmly and adequately conveying the
evidence in a way that does what someone else said justice.
Here lies the trick, though. Is all evidence the kind of evidence that could be fully
shared in an ideal situation, like repeating something said by another? Consider Smith
and Jones again, who, as it turns out, are police officers. Both are narcotics agents who
regularly deal with drug cases. At some point, though, Jones heads down a dark road and
begins stealing evidence and selling drugs on the side, for which he ends up in jail.
Smith, being Jones’ good friend, comes to visit him. The two of them converse for a
while, and eventually the inevitable comes up. Jones tells Smith that it is very bad being
in jail. To kill time, Smith asks how bad jail is. Jones begins to go into great detail about
how the prison guards rampantly violate the personal rights of the inmates. Smith is less
than convinced and says as much. Indignant, Jones replies, “You have no idea what it is
like on this side of the bars.”
Even though Jones has gone into great detail about how the prison guards violate
the personal rights of inmates, it may be the case that he has not fully shared his evidence
with Smith. The thing Jones is drawing on as evidence here is his experience of living in
prison. What Jones has as evidence is different than what Smith has as evidence. Jones is
thinking of an event, perception, or something that happened to him. Smith is thinking
about what Jones has told him, perhaps imagining being in Jones’ position. Part of the
evidence in play is the experience that Jones had in prison. Jones’ experience is

14
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qualitatively different than Smith’s knowledge about Jones’ experience, and there is no
way to change that fact. Remember again that Feldman conceptualizes evidence as an
understanding of something rather than the actual thing.15 Add to this concept of evidence
the fact that Smith’s understanding of Jones’ experience and Jones’ understanding of his
own experience will never be the same.
When Jones attempts to share his experience of prison, all he can really provide is
a testimony about his evidence. The new evidence is introduced for Smith’s sake, so that
Smith can get an idea of what evidence Jones is working from. It is not, by any means,
the same evidence that Jones has. We could try to state Jones’ evidence as a proposition
that captures its meaning for both Smith and Jones. Suppose we say, “Jones had the
experience of prison guards violating the rights of the inmates,” or, “Jones perceived the
prison guards as violating the rights of inmates.” Do we now have a statement that can
capture what both Smith and Jones think? What we really have, in truth, are two different
facts, neither of which captures Jones’ evidence. First, from Jones’ perspective, Jones had
an experience. From Smith’s perspective, he has the knowledge of the fact that Jones had
an experience. Even though they can (perhaps) agree on the above propositions, the fact
remains that they have not yet shared all the evidence. For that to happen, Smith would
have to have had Jones’ exact experience.
What would it take for Smith to have Jones’ experience? Even two people seeing
the same thing are seeing it from slightly different angles and are seeing it as two
different people (peer status, background beliefs), making each experience unique.
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Feldman recognizes experience as evidence. What is in question here is how experiential evidence is
uniquely difficult to share, not whether it is evidence in the first place.
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Consider a further thought experiment to illustrate. Suppose Smith ends up also stealing
and goes to prison. Suppose that Smith and Jones are at the same prison, and are even
cellmates. For all intents and purposes, they are experiencing close to the same thing.
Maybe Smith will now agree with Jones, but maybe he won’t. Why wouldn’t he? Smith
still wouldn’t be having the same exact experience as Jones. He would be experiencing
prison as Smith. That is a different experience than experiencing prison as Jones. What
would it look like for them to actually share the experience? Is there a conceivable way
for Smith to truly share Jones’ experience? It may be that Smith and Jones cannot do that,
no matter how much they may desire. Smith might try to amalgamate two of his
experiences together to get some idea of what Jones’ experience was like, but this
amalgamation doesn’t mean Smith had Jones’ exact experience by any stretch of the
imagination. Experiences may not be the type of thing that two people can really share.
We could try taking the thought experiment even further. Suppose that instead of
going to prison with Jones, Smith tries a new experimental device that beams Jones’
perceptions into Smith’s brain. For a few days, Smith sits on a couch and takes in Jones’
daily experience of prison. After all this, Smith may change his mind, or he may still
remain unconvinced. What could explain his failure to concede? Even though Smith is
now experiencing what Jones experiences, he is doing so as Smith and not Jones. He is
Smith experiencing Jones in prison, which is different from Jones experiencing Jones in
prison. Can the thought experiment be stretched far enough to make their experiences
identical? It looks like the only way to do this would be if the machine could somehow
cause Smith to stop being aware of being Smith, and think he is Jones having Jones’
experience of jail. Aha! Now Smith agrees with Jones, at least for as long as he remains
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unaware of being Smith! But wait! Now we have arrived right back where we did at the
outset: that Smith would only certainly agree with Jones if they were the same person. Of
course Jones and Jones would agree on Jones’ experience. Apart from mind-melding,
though, they could still disagree about a subjective experience. And there lies the
problem with Feldman’s argument. When experience becomes an essential part of a
disagreement, two people would only certainly agree if they were the same person, which
is already obvious. Since it wouldn’t make sense to disregard any and all evidence that
comes from subjective experience, that evidence really does bear on the disagreement
and can force a disagreement to remain reasonable so long as it is the type that it cannot
have a shared understanding.
The point I am making here is similar to the one I made in Section II. Two
epistemic peers would evaluate the same body of evidence in the same way. On a
fundamental level, though, the body of evidence can change depending on the person
experiencing it. This experience, if it does make a difference, cannot be ignored, and
Smith and Jones have reason to believe they are involved with different bodies of
evidence by virtue of the fact that they are two different people, even though they are two
different people experiencing the same thing. Smith experiencing prison is different than
Jones experiencing prison. The atheist’s experience of reality is different and not
interchangeable with the theist’s experience of reality.
Can’t much of our experiential evidence be shared, though? After all, it is very
often the case that we hear those words of encouragement, “I know how that feels.” Do
we usually doubt such comforting words? We do when we doubt the person speaking
them really understands or can relate to the experience we have had, but often we feel
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that other people really do know what it is like to feel how we feel. As long as the
understanding is “close enough,” maybe we could still be working from the same body of
experience. Feldman might say that while the experience cannot be shared, an account
could be given of that experience which could convey all the necessary information.
Suppose that Smith and Jones are male and female, respectively. Smith complains to
Jones about how he is tired of how women complain about how much harder it is to
compete for jobs in today’s world. In reply, Jones says something like, “You don’t know
what it is like to be a woman in today’s world.” Doesn’t Jones have a point? Maybe the
only way for Smith to know what it is like to be a woman, is for Smith to be a woman. If
Smith were to take classes in women’s studies, read a few books on the civil rights
movement, listen to Jones’ description of being a woman and in general learn what
prominent women have written down in books about their experience, but could still
learn something new by becoming a woman, there may be something to say for
experience as being unique as evidence. If no amount of physical information can fully
account for the difference in Smith and Jones’ experience, then their evidence can never
be fully shared in matters where experience is a decisive factor.
In cases where someone claims to know “how that feels,” usually some similar
experience of the person making the claim is involved. If Smith is downtrodden because
his parents are getting a divorce, Jones might say that she knows how Smith feels because
Jones’ parents also got divorced. Their experience is at least similar. But when Smith
tries to relate to Jones’ experience of being a woman, he draws a blank. Save really being
a woman, there is no experience close to Jones’.
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How experiential evidence applies to religious disagreements has to do with
whether the experiences that religious people have can be related to by those who are not
religious, and vice versa. In our prison thought experiment, it wouldn’t be unreasonable
to assume that if Smith and Jones were in prison together, their experience of prison life
would be close enough that they could agree on what does and does not go on in prison.
In other situations, like knowing “what it is like being a woman,” the situation is not so
clear-cut because unlike prison, someone cannot simply become a woman in order to
share the experience. Are religious experiences more like the former or the latter? Is
disbelief in God like going through a rough breakup and belief like falling in love,
something that most people can relate to? Or, are belief and disbelief in God more like
being male or female; are they experiences that, despite great effort, cannot be
manufactured for the sake of a disagreement? Religious beliefs, by their very nature, are
often beliefs formed about and around and to explain the meaning of experiences had.
They are also quite often very personal. They aren’t necessarily always going to be
formed in that way, of course. At least in theory, I can imagine someone who, for
instance, believes in the existence of God based entirely upon the cosmological argument.
Suppose this person meets an atheist who also knows and understands the cosmological
argument. These two people could probably sit down and discuss the evidence for and
against the cosmological argument, what the argument does and does not show, and rule
out reasonable disagreement. All of the evidence the believer had about God would be
evidence that could be fully shared with the atheist. At least in this example, all the
evidence could be shared. But such a case doesn’t seem to be the norm – many people
hold religious beliefs on the grounds of other things besides classical arguments.
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Belief in God is formed in different ways, making matters tricky. People believe
in God for a variety of reasons: some are taught as children to accept that God exists as a
matter of fact and have only the testimony of those they trust as evidence. Some say that
belief in God is formed on a very basic level, and that to cease believing the individual
needs to be proven wrong. Some claim their belief in God is entirely to do with
arguments for God’s existence, such as the cosmological argument. Some may claim that
something like the Bible proves that God exists. Some even claim to have experienced
miraculous events that have radically changed their perceptions of reality and belief in
God. Most would probably cite some other form of less exciting experiential evidence
like encountering the presence of God or feeling a deep oceanic sensation that convinces
the person having the experience that God is real.
This final group that points to miraculous events or religious experience has
experienced something that creates an epistemic gap. In these cases, experience that
cannot be shared is central to the argument. In some cases, perhaps the atheist used to
believe and claims to have had a similar experience to the theist. While at first glance this
experience seems to solve the problem, it really just reintroduces it. Now, the atheist has
an experience that the theist cannot relate to: having ceased to believe in God, or,
experiencing something that caused belief based on experience to end. The theist might
say something like, “experiencing what I do now, I cannot fathom what it would be like
to cease believing in God or what the experience that could cause such a change in belief
would be like.” The two are in the same boat they were in before, then, and reasonable
disagreement is the only avenue.
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For the most part, though, when the theist explains having had some sort of
religious experience that is convincing enough to be a reason for belief in God, how does
the atheist relate? If the experience is as described, then it seems the atheist would change
beliefs if the atheist also had the experience. But accepting that at face value would be
unsatisfactory because in most situations the atheist probably cannot imagine such a
feeling or experience, and certainly has not had a similar experience – the atheist cannot
relate to the theist in any way. Here, the theist has evidence that is central and crucial to
the belief the theist has in God, and the evidence cannot be shared with the atheist. The
atheist can try to imagine what it must be like for the theist to have had such an
experience, but such an imagination is different than the actual experience of the theist
because the atheist has no idea whether his interpretation is accurate. Even if the atheist
wants desperately to know what the theist experienced, that information is
nontransferable. The two are left with only the option of reasonable disagreement. The
theist does not know whether the experience would change the atheist’s evaluation of the
evidence and neither does the atheist because to know that, the atheist would have to have
that experience. Maybe having the experience would change the atheist’s mind, maybe it
wouldn’t, but without that knowledge, reasonable disagreement is the best option. This
problem could be generalized to other disagreements, but it is especially true of cases like
religious disagreement. In everyday life we have experiences that can be related to one
another, but in cases like religious experience, one person has an experience the other
simply cannot relate to.
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Section IV
Feldman wrote his article in response, at least to some degree, to the puzzling
nature of the disagreements he witnessed between his own students. He reasoned that if
his students were epistemic peers and shared all their evidence then they shouldn’t be
able to hold the sort of common sense position they had that they were all being
reasonable, because the uniqueness thesis rules out such a conclusion – someone has to
be wrong.
Feldman’s mistake is not necessarily that if his students are peers and share their
evidence they should change their attitude – he could be granted this, in my opinion,
because the implications are so limited. His students are not epistemic peers and they are
not able to share all the relevant evidence they are using to form their beliefs. Some of the
students might not be peers by virtue of their respective intelligence or education or
ability to evaluate evidence. Some of the students might be unintentionally withholding
evidence, omitting something that is affecting held beliefs. Some of their asymmetry
cannot be avoided, though. Many of the students have reason to judge each other as not
being epistemic peers, not because one is smarter than the other, but rather because their
starting points are too vastly different to be compatible – they aren’t on the same “page”.
Many of the students also have evidence they cannot share with their peers. Any evidence
that is experiential in nature will change as it changes hands – becoming a testimony of
something the peer has never experienced and cannot relate to. This exchange isn’t a real
sharing of evidence and cannot be one.
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Interestingly, Feldman gives an account of what an “apparent” reasonable
disagreement might go like:
After examining this evidence, I find in myself an inclination, perhaps a strong
inclination, to think that this evidence supports P. It may even be that I can’t help
but believe P. But I see that another person, every bit as sensible and serious as I,
has an opposing reaction. Perhaps this person has some bit of evidence that cannot
be shared, or perhaps he takes the evidence differently than I do. It’s difficult to
know everything about his mental life and thus difficult to tell exactly why he
believes as he does. One of us must be making some kind of mistake or failing to
see some truth. But I have no basis for thinking that the one making the mistake is
him rather than me. And the same is true of him. And in that case, the right thing
for both of us to do is to suspend judgment on P. 16
My argument is that as long as either party has reason to believe that someone has
possession of “some bit of evidence that cannot be shared,” there is good reason why two
peers could disagree. Further, so long as two people disagree on P, even if they are
“every bit as sensible and serious” as each other and of equal education, they have good
reason to believe they are not epistemic peers if they have differing background beliefs,
which could contribute to why they disagree on P in the first place. So long as they do
not judge each other to be epistemic peers, there is good reason why they disagree on P.
Feldman argued that his students could not reasonably disagree if they were
epistemic peers and shared all of their relevant evidence. He concluded: “I cannot make
good sense of the supportive attitude my students displayed.”17 I argue that his students
are not really epistemic peers because they have different background beliefs and that

16

Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on
Atheism and the Secular Life. Ed. Antony, Louise. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 194‐214. and the
Secular Life. Ed. Antony, Louise. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 212.
17
Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on
Atheism and the Secular Life. Ed. Antony, Louise. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 213.
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they cannot share all of their evidence because much of it is experiential. I conclude that
Feldman is wrong in that his students may very well call their disagreements reasonable.
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